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the putative father, in case the child is alive at the adjudication, to
support only from that date. It is very unlikely that it was intended
to thus place a premium on the ability of the accused to delay the
commencement of the action or the adjudication thereof. Since
support of the bastard child by the reputed father until it is eighteen
years old is the essence of the bastardy proceeding, it seems unwise,
in the light of what has been discussed above, for the court to im-
pose such limitation upon this obligation.
M. D. D.
POWER OF COURT TO 'MODIFY DECREE FOR SUPPORT
WHICH I NCORPORA.TES AGREEMENT OF PARTIES
The court incorporated into a divorce decree the principal pro-
visions of a separation agreement, providing for a property settle-
ment and for specified monthly payments by the father for the sup-
port of his minor child. Subsequently the father moved the court to
ater the decree so as to reduce the amount payable for support, on
the ground of changed conditions. Held, that the court had no au-
thority to reduce the amount ordered in the decree, as to do so would
be to impair the obligation of a contract.'
In the absence of such a coitract between the spouses, it is gen-
erally acknowledged that a court of equity may, upon proper allega-
tions of the changed conditions and circumstances of the parties,
modify the decree, either by increasing or decreasing the allowance.-
In the holding in the principal case. the Supreme Court of Ohio
went against the great weight of authority in Anerica,^ but was not
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inconsistent with the previous views taken by the Ohio courts.! The
decision is open to criticism on two points, both points being recog-
nized by Judge Zimmerman in his dissenting opinion:
(I.) The holding ignores the proposition that the rights arise
from the decree itself, as to which the agreement is merely evidence.5
"Such an agreement becomes merged into the decree and thereby
loses its contractural nature at least to the extent that the court has
power to modify the decree when changed circumstances so justify."'
That the provision for support is made part of the court's order by
agreement of the parties adds not a whit to the force and effect of
the decree,' nor divests the court of its right later to alter the decree.'
This point was mentioned by judge Zimmerman in the closing lines
of his opinion.! A decree for alimony does not depend upon the
agreement, which is merely helpful to the court in deciding what the
parties thought adequate and just, and which may in fact be ignored
altogether." This problem might be avoided if the trial court refused
to incorporate the agreement but included the terms of the agreement
in its decree, without any reference to the contract itself.
(2.) A distinction must be drawn between an order for alimony
and one for the support of a minor child or children. The jurisdic-
tion of the court over the persons of minor children of divorced
parties is continuing, even with no express reservation in the decree
itself.' Therefore, an allowance for the support of children may al-
ways be modified by the court because of changed conditions. Even
though the decree for the support of such children be based on an
agreement, the Ohio court does not hesitate to increase the amount of
support money, ignoring the fact that this is just as much an impair-
ment of contract rights as a decrease would be, on the ground of
public policy and to protect the interests of the children. " Might it
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not frequently be in accord with sound public policy, as well as to
the best interests of the minor children, to reduce the burden of the
one liable for the support when it becomes apparent that to deny such
reduction would be to work undue hardship on the father? "There
is no virtue in killing the goose which laid the golden eggs.""4
C. M. H.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
oHio GENErAL CODE SECTION 10512-19-RIGHT OF AN
ADOPTED CHILD TO INHERIT THROUGH ITS ADOPTIVE
PARENT
Lena Post died intestate, survived by two brothers and an adopted
son of her deceased sister. Upon a petition by her administrator to
determine the heirs of the estate, the Probate Court excluded the
adopted child as an heir. On appeal the Court of Appeals of Cuya-
hoga county reversed the Probate Court and held that the statute
4 descent and distribution, Ohio General Code, Section 10503-4 (6),
hen construed in connection with the adoption statute, Ohio Gen-
eral Code, Section 10512-19, permits an adopted child to inherit not
only from but also through its adoptive parent. White, Adm., v.
Meye'r, 66 Ohio App. 549, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 151 (1940).
The principal case is the most authoritative direct holding re-
ported since the adoption statute was amended in 1932. ' In arriving
at its decision the court disposes of a line of Supreme Court cases
to the contrary, by pointing out that they were all decided before the
1932 amendment was added to the adoption statute There are not
many reported cases interpreting the effect of this amendment. In
reading them one denotes a tendency on the part of the courts to
adhere to the rule established by the outmoded Supreme Court de-
I2 Lloyd, J., dissenting, in Campbell v. Campbell, 46 Ohio App. 197. See also dis-
-trting opinion of Zimmerman, J., in 138 Ohio St. 187, 20ot.1Sec Note (1940) 7 Ontio Sr. r L. J. 441, where the previous Ohio cases are dis-
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